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Abstract
Discrimination models have difficulties to study discrimination with-
out assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results
lead to workers’ segregation. In this article, the model uses oligopsony
and heterogeneity of workers’ preferences to obtain a persistent dis-
crimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay a lower wage
to the workers discriminated against whatever their taste for discrimi-
nation. A single prejudiced firm leads to a substancial wage gap in all
firms. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a non-zero
profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push
out prejudiced firms. Moreover, the wage gap is affected by firms’
spread out as well as by the number of prejudiced firms in the market.
Government policies decrease the impact of taste for discrimination on
wages but governments are not interested in.
Résumé
Les modèles de discrimination sur le marché du travail reproduisent dif-
ficilement sa persistance sans faire d’hypothèses fortes. Cela conduit de
surcroît à une ségrégation des travailleurs selon leurs caractéristiques
non-productives. Dans cet article, le modèle se sert de l’oligopsonie et
de l’hétérogénéité des préférences des travailleurs pour obtenir une per-
sistance de la discrimination. Un seul employeur discriminant induit
un différentiel de salaire substantiel sur le marché. Les entreprises em-
bauchent les deux types de travailleurs et offrent un salaire plus faible
aux travailleurs discriminés. Par conséquent, l’existence de discrimi-
nation sur le marché permet aux entreprises n’ayant pas de goût pour
la discrimination de faire des profits non-nuls. Elles n’ont donc pas
d’incitation à faire sortir les entreprises discriminantes du marché.
JEL Codes: J42, J71, L13
Keywords: Discrimination, oligopsony, wage gap
Motes clés : Discrimination, oligopsonie, différentiel de salaire
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1 Introduction
Competition and discrimination on the labor market are closely related in
theory as in empirical studies. Discrimination is introduced in economics
by Becker (1957) as a different treatment of two persons, whose observable
productive characteristics are similar, due to a non-productive characteris-
tic. Becker considers that discrimination is due to a taste of employers,
customers or workers. Within this framework, members of the group dis-
criminated against receive a lower wage in order to be hired and accepted as
employees, co-workers or salespersons. A perfect competition induces a zero
profit market, which means that prejudiced firms, less competitive than the
others due to higher wages, exit the market. Their presence signifies that
they make extra-profit or are more productive than the other firms to stay
in the market. Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) improve the explanation of
discrimination by considering it as a result of beliefs. Indeed, employers only
know the productivity level of workers belonging to their group. To set a
wage for the other workers, they use the expectancy of the average level of
productivity of the group workers belong to. And, generally, their beliefs are
that the other groups are less productive in average. Consequently the wage
of the workers of other groups is lower than the wage of the majority. Time
will remove this statistical discrimination because employers will learn the
true productivity of their workers and discrimination will disappear. This
paper is focused on the Becker’s taste for discrimination but discrimination
can be also interpreted as statistical discrimination.
Empirically, Black & Strahan (2001) show that, when the banking sector
was deregulated in the middle of the 1970’s, the wage gap between women
and men decreased, and more women worked in this sector, with higher
positions. Decreasing rents, as deregulation done, leads to a reduction in
discrimination because firms can no more over-paid workers of the majority
and stay competitive. A study of Black & Brainerd (1999) explains that in-
creased competition through trade did contribute to the relative improvement
in female wages in concentrated relative to competitive industries, suggest-
ing that, at least in this sense, trade may benefit women by reducing firms’
ability to discriminate. The existence of imperfect competition justifies the
persistence of discrimination on the labor market. It means that companies
have rents or are more productive than the others and can satisfy their taste
for discrimination. They are able to stay competitive and do not leave the
market. These studies only focus on the impacts of the relation between
3
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competition on the product market and discrimination. But discrimination
is not only inconsistent with competition on the product market, but also
with the labor market competition theory. According to it, a worker is paid
to her marginal productivity and two workers with identical abilities have
to be equally paid. The presence of discrimination involves that employers
do not pay the workers at their marginal productivity and take into account
other workers’ characteristics. In a usual framework, employers are wage
takers and cannot discriminate. In order to be wage setters, employers are
assumed to have a market power to fix the wage. The imperfection of the
labor market is an argument of the persistence of discrimination and, as this
paper shows, leads every firm to discriminate.
Theoretically, only search and matching models use the imperfection of
the labor market to explain discrimination. The introduction of frictions
allows a framework of imperfect competition but strong assumptions are
necessary to obtain a persistent discrimination. Black (1995) developed first
a search model leading to a long-lasting wage gap but he assumes that preju-
diced firms are more productive than the average in order to stay competitive
in the market and it results that firms segregate workers. Then search and
matching models lean on this kind of assumption to fit to the persistence of
discrimination. Moreover, matching models focus on ex ante bargaining and
this is maladaptive to low wages, which are more often posted.
In this paper, I consider a taste-based model where workers are not paid
at their marginal productivity. The workers take into account non-wage char-
acteristics of the job. It could be a physical distance, as I use later, social
characteristics of the firm job condition or informational frictions. This hy-
pothesis is usually called heterogeneity of workers’ preferences and allows
firms to exercise a market power in the labor market. This model of oligop-
sony with heterogeneous workers’ preferences is based on the model of Salop
(1979). It allows to obtain a during wage gap between the majority and
the minority without segregation. The main contributions of this paper are,
first, that a single prejudiced firm is sufficient to induce a significant wage
gap in the market. Second, unprejudiced firms discriminate against the mi-
nority without any taste for discrimination or beliefs about them. Moreover
unprejudiced firms are not incited to compete with prejudiced firms to push
them out because they profit of the existence of discrimination. Then, I an-
alyze public policies consisting in wage equalization laws, affirmative action,
employment subventions or minimum wage establishment. To my knowledge,
this is the first time that this model is applied to issues of discrimination on
4
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the labor market. Thisse & Zenou (1995), Wauthy & Zenou (1999), Hamil-
ton et al. (2000) used this model to study employment and training policies.
Bhaskar & To (2003) employed it to obtain a wage dispersion and survey the
possible uses of the model in Bhaskar et al. (2002). The former expound the
intuition of this paper among other applications of the model.
This paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2.
The effects of competition on labor market discrimination are observed in
Section 3. Then, Section 4 studies the policies implications. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 General framework
The market is made up of n firms uniformly distributed around a circle city.
The distance between two firms is also 1
n
. Each firm only uses labor as input
in order to product a good sold p on a competitive market. Each worker
products one output during the period. To simplify the resolution of the
model, there is no free entry or exit in the market.
The labor market is composed by a continuum of workers split out in two
types: The Greens and the Reds. The two populations of workers only differ
because of an observable characteristic that does not affect their productivity.
The Reds represent γ of the working population and both types of workers
are identically distributed around the circular market. There are two types
of employers. One type is characterized by a discriminatory taste and the
other type is indifferent about the observable characteristic that distinguishes
workers. A proportion η of employers are taste-based prejudiced against
the minority workers. Let d be the monetary term, which denominates the
manager’s psychic cost of hiring a Red worker.
•
Fi
•
Fi+1
1
n
Figure 1: Dispersion of firms
In order to work, the Reds and the Greens have to go to a firm i. All
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travels occur along the circle and each worker, which covers a distance x to
work in a firm, spends tx to go all the way, where t is the commutation cost.
The introduction of distance to job is equivalent to introduce heterogeneity
of workers’ preferences. This distance is a physical distance but it can also be
interpreted as non-wage characteristics of jobs offered by the firms (type of
contract, full or part-time, etc), characteristics of the firms themselves (size,
environmental or social policies, etc) or informational frictions. It means that
different jobs are not perfect substitutes for each other. Consequently, the
labor supply does not react to a slight wage modification: The elasticity of
the supply to the wage is weak. The heterogeneity leads to a market power
in favor of firms, which can set their wage and firms are in a situation of
oligopsony in the labor market.
Let wji denotes the wage offered by the firm i to the workers of the
groups j. A worker accepts a job offer only if her net wage is higher than the
reservation wage. To keep a simple framework without a loss of generality,
the reservation wage is normalized to zero. The worker’s net wage is the
wage offered by a firm minus the cost of transportation to go to work. As
a worker of the group j located at x pays a cost tx to work for the firm i,
her net wage is wji − tx. In other words, she decides to work for the firm i
if the transportation costs are lower than the wage offered. But the firm i is
not alone on the market and the workers compare the net wages offered by
the firms. Then she works for the firm i only if the net wage offered by the
firm i is higher than the net wage offered by the other firms. In mathematic
language, she will work for the firm i only if wji − tx > wjk − t(
1
n
− x) for
each k.
The employers’ utility function contains both profits and a parameter
summarizing the disutility associated to the promotion of Red workers. This
means that only Red workers face the risk to be discriminated against, be-
cause of the observable characteristics that, without affecting their produc-
tivity, differentiates them from other workers. The owner of a representative
firm i is assumed to maximize utility over the objectives of profit, employment
of Green workers and employment of Red workers, noted Ui(Πi, LGi, LRi).
Employers hire workers as long as it generates benefits. When the output
sale is no more sufficient to compensate input pay, employers stop take on.
Indeed, in order to attract more workers, a firm has to offer higher wages
to compensate higher commutation costs. Then, both types of firms face a
straightforward utility function:
6
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.05
Ui = p(LGi + LRi)− wGiLGi − (wRi + di)LRi (1)
where di = d if the firms i is a prejudiced firm and di = 0 otherwise, and
Lji is the number of employed workers belonging to the group j as input.
Note that d could be due to statistical discrimination. In this case, prejudiced
employers assume that the Red workers are in average less productive than
the Green workers due to beliefs about the Red population, unknown of these
employers. They also suppose that the productivity of the Reds is in average
1− p
w
and set a corresponding wage of w− d for them. The following results
are identical because the model is static and employers cannot learn the true
productivity of Reds.
In this model, I assume that the labor market is covered. Indeed, in
the opposite case, an unemployment pocket is formed between firms. All
individuals in this pocket have a net wage negative, whatever the firm, which
proposes the wage. Then, firms are locally monopsonistic because labor pools
are unconnected. Then there are no more interactions between firms and the
study becomes less interesting. In order to take unemployment into account,
a heterogeneous reservation wage has to be introduce. The model becomes
too complex for this study and could be the topic of another paper.
2.2 The case of four firms
In this section, I dwell on the case when n = 4 to explore more easily the
properties of the model. All results can be generalized to n firms.
When |wji − wji+1| ≤
t
4
for each i and d ≤ 5
6
t, workers located between i
and i + 1 have no incentive to work for another firm than i or i + 1. They
make a decision by comparing net wages offered by both firms. Both types
of workers are uniformly distributed around the circle, then the decision-
making is identical whatever the group the worker belongs to. It means that
they compare the wage set by the firm i minus the transportation cost to
go to this firm with what offered the firm i + 1 minus commutation costs
to go to this one. Considering the former notation, an individual decides
to work for the firm i if wji − xt > wji+1 − (
1
4
− x)t. The worker located
at x˜ = 1
2t
( t
4
+ wji − wji+1) is indifferent between working for firms i or
i + 1. All workers located up to her will work for the firm i because their
7
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transportation costs are lower. The others will work for i + 1. Since there
is a similar set of workers on the other side of firm i, their labor supply is
symmetric. Consequently; the labor supply of the firm 1 is:
Li = γ
1
t
(
t
4
+ wRi − w¯Ri
)
+ (1− γ)
1
t
(
t
4
+ wGi − w¯Gi
)
(2)
where w¯ji =
1
2
(wji−1 + wji+1) is the average of wages offered by direct
neighbors of the firm i. As firms face to the both types of workers, the labor
supply is composed of the Greens’ and Reds’ supplies (the left hand side and
the left hand side, respectively).
In this model, the firms compete in wages to attract workers. Then,
they take into account the behavior of their neighbors and introduce the
wage offered by the nearest firms to set their wage up. They maximize their
utility to obtain their reaction function(s). Substituting the equation of labor
supply (2.2) into the utility function (2.1) and then solving the first order
condition yields the firms’ optimal wages as:
wGi =
1
2
(
p−
t
4
+ w¯Gi
)
wRi =
1
2
(
p−
t
4
+ w¯Ri − di
)
As all firms take into accounts the decisions of their neighbors, the firm i is
affected by the decision taken by all firms. Moreover, it is worth to notice that
the term of discrimination does not directly appear in the reaction function
of unprejudiced firms. Their reaction function is the same whatever the
worker’s group and the wage gap is induced by the term which depends on
neighborhood’s wages, then on the prejudiced firm. The non-discriminatory
firms take advantage of the weakness of the Red workers’ labor demand
to offer them a lower wage. The presence of one prejudiced firm in the
market impacts all wages of Reds, even if their employer is unprejudiced.
Consequently, a wage gap is observable between wages of Reds and Greens in
every firms of the market.
The wage of Greens is not affected by the taste for discrimination. It
is identical for all firms because reaction functions are the same whatever
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the firm and is worth wGi = p −
t
4
. This wage is not equal to the level of
productivity of workers because of commutation costs. A wage dispersion
is possible if the productivity of firms is heterogeneous. But I want to keep
a simple framework in order to observe better the results. I suppose also a
uniform productivity without a loss of generality.
the proportion of prejudiced firms on the market impacts positively this
mean wage gap between Reds and Greens. The mean wage gap with one prej-
udiced firm on the market is 1
4
d. It increases to 1
2
d when two discriminatory
firms are on the market and reaches to 3
4
d with three prejudiced firms.
To explode the impact of the dispersion of firms on the circle, suppose
that η = 0.5 and that firms 1 and 2 are unprejudiced and firms 3 and 4 have
a taste for discrimination against the Reds. The Figure 2 shows the different
possible layout. In the first one, different types of firms alternate and in the
second one, similar firms are side-by-side.
•
F1
•F3•F4
•
F2
•
F1
•F2•F3
•
F4
Figure 2: Four firms, prejudiced firms alternate with unprejudiced one on the left (A),
identical firms side-by-side on the right (B).
The equilibrium wage of Greens is not sensitive to the spread out of firms.
But the wage of Reds varies with the dispersion of firms. Indeed, when
prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate, equilibrium wages of Reds are
wR1 = wR2 = p−
t
4
−
1
3
d
wR3 = wR4 = p−
t
4
−
2
3
d
and when identical firms are side-by-side, equilibrium wages are
wR1 = wR2 = p−
t
4
−
1
4
d
wR3 = wR4 = p−
t
4
−
3
4
d
9
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The wage gap between Reds and Greens is less than d in the prejudiced
firm because of the competition with the unprejudiced firms. It is worth to
note that the wage of Reds offered by the non-discriminatory firms is lower
than the wage of Greens. It explains that the unprejudiced firms are not
prompted to have out the prejudiced firms because they are a source of their
profit. In both cases, the mean wage of Reds is p − t
4
− 1
2
d. Consequently,
the mean wage gap does not fluctuate with the dispersion of the firms. But
the wage differential between Reds employed by prejudiced and unprejudiced
firms is higher when identical firms are side-by-side than when they alternate.
In the case A, a Red worker employed by an unprejudiced firm earns 1
3
d more
than one employed by a prejudiced firms against only 1
4
d in the case B. The
spread out of firms around the circle impacts the standard deviation of wages
of workers discriminated against but does not impact the mean wage of Red
workers.
Concerning the wage bill, variations are observable according the intensity
of discriminatory taste, firms spread out and the number of firms on the
market. The wage bill of Greens is identical whatever the firms and is worth
1
4
. The whole variations of the wage bill are also due to the Reds. When
prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate (A), the wage bills of firms are:
LR1 = LR2 =
1
4
+
1
3t
γd
LR3 = LR4 =
1
4
−
1
3t
γd
When identical firms are side-by-side (B), the wage bills of firms are:
LR1 = LR2 =
1
4
+
1
4t
γd
LR3 = LR4 =
1
4
−
1
4t
γd
The wage bill is lower in prejudiced firms. But it increases with the close-
ness of other prejudiced firms. Indeed, when two prejudiced firms are side-
by-side, their power on Reds located between them is higher and they can
offer a lower wage and attract more Reds than when their neighbor is an
unprejudiced firm, which offers a higher wage.
Moreover, the wage bill impacts profits: because the productivity is a
constant factor, firms increase their profit until the wage set is too high to
do benefits. Indeed, in order to attract an additional worker, the employer
10
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has to increase slightly her wage to compensate for the commutation costs
of a more distant individual. The higher the wage bill, the higher are wages.
When prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate (A), the profits of firms
are:
Π1 = Π2 =
t
16
+ γd
(
1
6
+
d
3t
)
Π3 = Π4 =
t
16
+ γd
(
1
12
+
2d
9t
)
When identical firms are side-by-side(B), the profits of firms are:
Π1 = Π2 =
t
16
+ γd
(
1
8
−
d
16t
)
Π3 = Π4 =
t
16
+ γd
(
1
8
−
3d
16t
)
Profits are sensible to discrimination and spread out of firms. In both
cases, discrimination increases profits of all firms, but more in the unpreju-
diced firms than in the prejudiced firms. Moreover the profits are higher for
the unprejudiced firms and when they alternate with prejudiced firms. They
increase with the level of the taste for discrimination. The prejudiced firms
make less profits but it increases with the proximity of similar firms.
The utility of employers is closely related to their profits: Ui(pii, LGi, LRi) =
pii − diLRi. Without taste-based discrimination, utility and profit are equal.
The prejudiced firms have a lower utility because of the taste for discrimina-
tion.
To summarize this section, the presence of one prejudiced firm on the
market induces a lower wage for all workers discriminated against. The
unprejudiced firms make also an extra-profit and are not incited to compete
each other in order to push out prejudiced firms.
3 Impact of competition
Becker assumes that the degree of competition impacts the intensity of dis-
crimination on the labor market. Higher the degree of competition, lower
the opportunity to satisfy a taste for discrimination. In this part, different
11
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variations of competition are studied to observe their impact on discrimina-
tion. As in the former section, suppose that four firms are on the market, 1
and 2 do not have a taste for discrimination and 3 and 4 have one.
A variation of t is equivalent to a variation of the degree of competition
in the labor market. When t decreases and |wji − wji+1| ≤
t
4
, the wage
gap reduces in proportion but stays identical in value because there is no
interactions between the transportation cost and the discriminatory term.
When the transportation cost is sufficiently high such that the wage dif-
ferential between prejudiced and unprejudiced firms is higher than t
4
, some
workers have incentive to work for another firm than one of both nearest
firms. It means that other firms of the circle offer a net wage higher than
the net wage offered by the both nearest firms. The constraint on the term
of discrimination is d > 5
6
t. The labor supply now depends on the type of
firm that the worker can reach. For the prejudiced firm, no Red workers
chooses to work for this firm because the wage proposed by unprejudiced
firms is sufficiently high to compensate the additional transportation costs
to go as far as them. Then, the labor supply of Reds is only shared between
unprejudiced firms. Then the labor supply of firm i is
Li =
1
t
(1− γ)
[
t
4
+ (wGi − w¯Gi)
]
+ γ
1
t
[
t
2
+ wRi − w¯Ri′
]
if i is unprejudiced
Li =
1
t
(1− γ)
[
t
4
+ (wGi − w¯Gi)
]
if i is prejudiced
where wRi′ is Reds’ wage offered by the other unprejudiced firm.
Employers maximize their utility taking into account the labor supply and
wages offered by their neighbors. Substituting labor supplies into utilities and
then solving the first order condition yields the reaction functions as:
wGi =
1
2
(p−
t
4
+ w¯Gi)
wRi =
1
2
(p−
t
2
+ w¯Ri)
Then equilibrium wages are:
12
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wG1 = wG2 = wG3 = wG4 = p−
t
4
wR1 = wR2 = p−
t
2
The impact of the term of discrimination is not directly observable be-
cause only unprejudiced firms are interested in hiring Red workers. It inter-
fere only in the decision process of workers and no more in the maximization
process of firms. The labor demand of Red workers is also lower than the
one of Green workers. Due to this weakness of demand, the wage of Reds
offered by unprejudiced firms is lower than the wage of Greens. Indeed, the
sub-market of Red workers contains only the unprejudiced firms. Then, the
market power of the unprejudiced firms is higher than former and they set
lower wages to maximize their profit. Both unprejudiced firms are in compe-
tition à la Cournot. As in matching models, a segregation can be observed
because prejudiced firms do not hire Red workers and the wage differential
comes essentially of the differential of labor demand of Reds and Greens. The
results concerning wages, spread out of firms and composition of the wage
bill are still true in the case of overall competition.
The situation is more complex when the number of firms on the market
is higher. Indeed, the wage differential can be sufficiently high between some
firms to allow Red workers to work for unprejudiced firms but not between
others. Consequently, some Red individuals have to work for a prejudiced
firm because she cannot reach the nearest unprejudiced firm. Then, the
market becomes very heterogeneous and many situations are conceivable.
The effect on the wage gap is ambiguous: the demand of labor of Reds
is lower and the wage of Reds lowers. But the market power is no more
symmetrically shared and the fact that some firms have more market power
decreases wages in some parts of the market and increases it in other parts.
The impact of discrimination is also indirect. Despite the difficulty to solve
the model in more complex case, it is straightforward that the presence of
prejudiced firms is sufficient to lower the wage of Red workers.
For the special case, when t = 0, the market is perfectly competitive and
workers can choose any firm without additional costs. Red workers choose
one of both non-discriminatory firms and their wage stays lower because the
demand of Reds’ labor is lower than the demand of Greens’ labor. The wage
gap is only based on the difference of the number of unprejudiced and preju-
diced firms. The more unprejudiced firms on the market, larger is the wage
13
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•
F1
•F2•F3
•
F4
•F5
Figure 3: A fifth firm enters the market.
differential between the both types of workers.
An increase of the number of firms n has an impact on the competition
on the labor market. Higher is the quantity of firms on the market, closer
to the perfect competition. But this model is static and firms are uniformly
distributed around the circle. When the number of firms increases and if
they stay uniformly distributed, the impact of the transportation costs on
wages is lower. Then wages rise with the number of firms and come closer to
the productivity of workers. But the impacts of discrimination remain the
same as describe in the former section.
Nevertheless the effect is different if the spread out of firms is invariant.
Indeed, the former firms are already located on the circle, and the new one
has to be inserted between two old firms. Then, firms are no longer uniformly
distributed on the circle. The market power of firms in the neighborhood of
the new entrant decreases whereas the market power of the firms far away
increases. Consequently, the formers fix a lower wage than the others. In both
cases: a new unprejudiced firm decreases the impact of the discriminatory
taste whereas a new prejudiced firm increases it.
Keeping the former example of four firms, assume that a fifth firm wants
to enter the market. It takes a location between two firms also installed (see
figure 3). Depending on the spread out of the other firms, it can be between
two identical firms or two different firms. In both cases, the distance between
the last entered and their neighbors is 1
8
instead of 1
4
in the rest of the circle.
Consequently the sharing of the market power evolves: the market power of
the old firms, near the new one, decreases because of the closeness of this
new firm. On the contrary, both firms, which are not mixed with the new
firm, have a higher market power and can set a lower wage for their workers.
14
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Indeed, the level of competition is lower in this side of the circle.
Moreover the new firm will fix up in the neighborhood of prejudiced firms
in order to set a lower wage for the Reds. Indeed, it has incentive to locate
near the prejudiced firms whatever its type. When the firm is prejudiced,
its effect is to lower wages of the Reds. Its taste for discrimination is more
satisfied than when the firm is among unprejudiced firm because the wage
set up is higher. When the firm is unprejudiced, its profits are higher if it
is located among prejudiced firms. Indeed, the wage of the Reds is lower
in this area. Moreover, the firm attracts more Red workers and make more
profits. Then the firm benefits of the presence of prejudiced firms in its direct
neighborhood.
Thereby, when the taste for discrimination is too high or the commutation
costs are sufficiently low, workers have incentive to go in another firms than
the nearest. The direct impact of discrimination decreases but the demand
for labor of the minority remains lower than the one of the majority. A wage
differential persists in the market. In the extreme case where the transporta-
tion costs disappear, the individuals of the minority are only employed by
non-discriminatory firms.
When a new firm enters the market, the effect is different because it
modifies the sharing of market power. Strategically, the new entrant settles
where the highest number of prejudiced firms are located.
4 Policy implications
The former section shows that an improvement of competition decreases the
wage gap but it still keeps existing. And since imperfect competition is clearly
acknowledged as a reality, governments have to lead suitable policies in order
to decrease the wage gap due to discrimination. The next Section describes
four possible policies aiming to fight discrimination: minimum wage estab-
lishment, employment subsidies, wages equalization and affirmative action.
The wages and the reaction functions are calculated from the case of four
firms described former.
15
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.05
Minimum wage
The government introduces a minimum wage in order to secure a weaker
wage gap. If the minimum wage is a constraint for the prejudiced firms to
set up a low wage for the Red people, the wage gap decreases. The minimum
wage, noted wm, can be set up in three main intervals of value: if wm is
lower than the lowest wage, no firms are constrained. If it is higher than
the highest wage, all the firms are constrained and the wage gap disappears.
Third, the minimum wage is set up between the lower wage and the wage of
Greens. The last interval is the more interesting one. The prejudiced firms
are constrained by the minimum wage and set wRi = wm. The wages are in
appendix. It is worth to notice that a minimum wage higher than the lowest
wage increases the wage of Red workers whatever the type of firm. Indeed,
the reaction functions depend on the repartition of wages. If the lowest wage
increases, all wages increase. When the minimum wage is higher than p− d,
the prejudiced firms does not employ Red workers.
To extend, the case when every firms are constrained for all wages can
reach the first best solution. Indeed, if wm = p, workers earn their produc-
tivity level and this is the case of perfect competition. But this is an extreme
decision and to set a relatively high minimum wage induces a negative impact
on hiring and cannot be used.
Employment subsidies
The government can lead a policy aiming to subsidize the wages of Reds in
order to compensate the impact of discrimination. The subsidy is allocated
to every firm based on the stock of Red workers on its roll to pull up the
wage rates of all discriminated workers. As the government does not know
the type of firms, it subsidizes all wages of Reds and not only the wages
of Reds hired by prejudiced firms. The utility function of firms becomes
Ui = pLi − βLi − wGiLGi − (wRi + di − s)LRi, where s is the amount of
subsidies per Red worker and β a tax per worker intended to finance the
subsidy. The maximization leads up to following reaction functions:
wGi =
1
2
(
p− β −
t
4
+ w¯Gi
)
wRi =
1
2
(
p− β −
t
4
+ w¯Ri − di + s
)
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If the government is budget constrained, receipts and expenses are equal
and β = sLR
L
. If the government is financed by loan, it does not need taxes
and β = 0. In both cases, the subsidy on wages of Red workers raises wages of
Reds by its amount whatever the firm. The method of funding only changes
the impact of the policy on wages of Greens. In the case of loan funding,
the wage of Greens does not vary and their situation is identical. If the
government has to balance receipts and expenses, subsidies are bared by all
workers, so it is equivalent to a tax on the hiring of Green workers.
Wage equalization
When a government leads a policy of wage equalization, firms have to offer
the same wage to workers equally productive. In this model, the productivity
of workers is identical whatever the group they belong to. Then, firms have
to set the same wage for the Greens and the Reds. Their utility function
becomes Ui = p(LGi + LRi) − wiLGi − (wi + di)LRi = pLi − wiLi − diLRi.
The maximization of the utility of firms conducts to the following reaction
function:
wi =
1
2
(
p−
t
4
+ w¯i − γdi
)
The firms set a unique wage and the wage gap totally vanishes within each
firm. The wages depend now on the proportion of Reds in the working
population. The more they are, lower are the wages. In the configuration A,
the wage differential between unprejudiced and prejudiced firms is 1
3
γd. It
reaches 1
2
γd in the configuration B. In both cases, the Reds earn a higher
wage than without the wage equalization policy because γ < 0 but the wages
of Greens are lower. Moreover, the unprejudiced firms employ more Green
workers than the prejudiced firms due to a higher wage. Nevertheless, the
wages of Greens are lower than without the policy.
The disappearance of the direct impact of discrimination on wages within
firms affects negatively the well-being of the majority. Consequently, in a
democratic system, the government is not incited to reduce discrimination
for fear of missing a re-election.
Affirmative action
Affirmative action consists in imposing quota of workers from the minority
on firms. It secures a minimum level of employment of workers discriminated
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against in each firm. Suppose that the aim is to employ a minimal proportion
of τ Red workers in each firm. Assume τ ≤ γ to obtain a solution and τ
is superior of the proportion of Red workers in the prejudiced firm setting
the lowest wage. The firms maximize their utility as in Section 2.2 under
constraint that LRi ≥ τ .
The presence of quota on Red workers affects all wages in all firms. When
the government leads an affirmative action policy, the negative impact of
transportation costs on wages of Greens is higher than without the policy,
but it is lower for Reds in both types of firms. The discriminatory term
impacts negatively the wage of Greens but positively the wage of Reds. The
general impact is also positive on the wage of workers discriminated against
and negative on the wage of workers belonging to the majority. In the case
A, the effect on wages of workers of prejudiced firms is two times higher than
the one on wages of workers of unprejudiced firms. The variations of the
transportation costs are explained by the correlation between the numbers of
workers of both types. Indeed, a discriminatory firm has to employ relatively
more Reds and/or fewer Greens. Then the wage of Reds has to be higher to
attract more Red workers and/or the wage of Greens has to be lower because
the location of the last Green employed is shorter.
As the Greens are the majority of the working population, governments
do not want to risk to miss the re-election and have no incentive to lead this
policy.
To conclude this section, a high minimum wage solves the problem but is
economically inefficient. A Red workers employment subsidy does not lead to
a first best solution and has no impact on the wage of Greens only in the case
of a funding by loan. The more efficient policies are the wage equalization
and the affirmative action however the governments are not incited to lead
them because of the loss of well-being of the majority.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that a taste-based model of discrimination can match the
stylized facts of persistence of discrimination. The model is based on het-
erogeneity of workers’ preferences, which leads to an employers’ non neg-
ligible market power over their workers. This assumption induces a wage
gap, which will not disappear. Indeed, the unprejudiced firms make non-zero
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profits due to the existence of discriminatory firms in the market and they
are not prompted to drive out prejudiced firms because they are a source
of profit. Contrary to most models of the literature, there is no segregation
between groups and both types of workers are hired by all the firms. Last
but not least, the existence of only one prejudiced firm in the market leads to
a wage gap between Reds and Greens without any differences in observable
productive abilities. The wage of Reds is not unique and depends on the
concentration of unprejudiced firms.
A higher competition on the market reduces the wage gap but is not
sufficient to make it disappear. A complementary policy is necessary but the
governments are not incited to lead it due to electoral implications.
In this model, firms are assumed homogeneous. A model with heteroge-
neous firms and productivity level could be implemented. It is also natural
to expect the more productive firms to have higher sales, which requires
a larger labor force. Being more productive, these firms can afford to pay
higher wages to attract the additional workers they need. Then, the wages of
Greens follow a distribution and are not identical whatever the firm. However
the results would be unchanged.
Unemployment issues are a future extension of this paper. Indeed, in the
actual model, unemployment leads to monopsony. Heterogeneous reservation
wage is a solution to introduce unemployment and keep the interest of the
model.
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A Impact of competition
In the layout described in Figure 3, a prejudiced firm enters the market and
sets up between the both unprejudiced firms. Then the wages offered to the
Reds are:
wR1 = wR2 = p−
47
152
t−
7
19
d
wR3 = wR4 = p−
41
152
t−
15
19
d
wR5 = p−
33
152
t−
13
19
d
If this fifth firm chose to set up between the both prejudiced firms, the
wages offered to the Reds would be:
wR1 = wR2 = p−
41
152
t−
5
19
d
wR3 = wR4 = p−
47
152
t−
15
19
d
wR5 = p−
33
152
t−
17
19
d
B Policy implications
B.1 Employment subsidies
When prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate (A), equilibrium wages
are
wR1 = wR2 = p− β −
t
4
+
1
3
(s− d)
wR3 = wR4 = p− β −
t
4
+
2
3
(s− d)
and when identical firms are side-by-side (B), equilibrium wages are
wR1 = wR2 = p− β −
t
4
+
1
4
(s− d)
wR3 = wR4 = p− β −
t
4
+
3
4
(s− d)
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B.2 Minimum wage
When prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate (A), equilibrium wages
are
wR1 = wR2 =
1
2
(
p− t
4
+ wm
)
wR3 = wR4 = wm
and when identical firms are side-by-side (B), equilibrium wages become
wR1 = wR2 =
2
3
(
p− t
4
+ 1
2
wm
)
wR3 = wR4 = wm
B.3 Wage equalization
When prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate (A), equilibrium wages
are
w1 = w2 = p−
t
4
−
1
3
γd
w3 = w4 = p−
t
4
−
2
3
γd
and when identical firms are side-by-side (B), equilibrium wages become
w1 = w2 = p−
t
4
−
1
4
γd
w3 = w4 = p−
t
4
−
3
4
γd
B.4 Affirmative action
When prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate (A), equilibrium wages
are
wG1 = wG2 = p−
t
4
(
1 + τ(τ(1−γ)−γ(1−τ))
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
− 1
3
(
(1−τ)τγ
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
d
wR1 = wR2 = p−
t
4
(
1− (1−τ)(τ(1−γ)−γ(1−τ))
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
− 1
3
(
1− (1−τ)
2γ
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
d
wG3 = wG4 = p−
t
4
(
1 + 2τ(τ(1−γ)−γ(1−τ))
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
− 2
3
(
(1−τ)τγ
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
d
wR3 = wR4 = p−
t
4
(
1− 2(1−τ)(τ(1−γ)−γ(1−τ))
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
− 2
3
(
1− (1−τ)
2γ
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
d
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and when identical firms are side-by-side (B), equilibrium wages become
wG1 = wG2 = p−
t
4
(
1 + τ(τ(1−γ)−γ(1−τ))
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
− 1
4
(
(1−τ)τγ
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
d
wR1 = wR2 = p−
t
4
(
1− (1−τ)(τ(1−γ)−γ(1−τ))
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
− 1
4
(
1− (1−τ)
2γ
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
d
wG3 = wG4 = p−
t
4
(
1 + 2τ(τ(1−γ)−γ(1−τ))
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
− 3
4
(
(1−τ)τγ
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
d
wR3 = wR4 = p−
t
4
(
1− 2(1−τ)(τ(1−γ)−γ(1−τ))
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
− 3
4
(
1− (1−τ)
2γ
τ2(1−γ)+γ(1−τ)2
)
d
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